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Draft 5, August 24 2014 
Introduction to the Symposium on Equality versus Priority 
Alex Voorhoeve 
 
This symposium publishes for the first time three key contributions to the debate on the 
nature and importance of the distinction between egalitarianism (the view that it is in itself 
bad, when and because it is unfair, for some to be worse off than others) and 
prioritarianism (the view that each person’s utility has diminishing marginal moral value and 
that the moral value of a person’s utility depends only on that person’s level of utility, and 
not on how anyone else fares). These papers were commissioned by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 2000. They were intended for publication in a WHO volume which 
has not yet materialized, and this has hindered access to these important papers. Permission 
was therefore secured from the WHO to publish them here.1 
 Marc Fleurbaey’s paper questions the practical significance of the distinction 
between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. He argues that the prioritarian’s ranking of two 
distributions of final utilities can always be represented by a pluralist egalitarian ranking, 
which cares about both average utility and inequality. It follows that a prioritarian’s choices 
will always coincide with the choices of a particular kind of egalitarian when the outcomes 
of these choices are known.  
 In response, John Broome argues while choices under certainty may not reveal a 
practical difference between the two views, choices under risk must do so. Consider the 
choice between prospect , which entails either (1 util for Ann, 1 for Bob) or (2 for Ann, 2 
                                                     
1
 A fourth important paper commissioned by the WHO, “Equality or Priority in Health Care Distribution?” by 
Larry Temkin, is not reproduced here because many of its key ideas have subsequently appeared in print, 
including in this journal. See Temkin (2000, 2003).  
for Bob), with equal probability, and prospect , which entails either (1, 2) or (2,1), with 
equal probability. Both prospects yield the same egalitarian distribution of expected utility. 
But only  ensures equality in final utilities. Therefore, an egalitarian who cares about 
equality in final utilities should prefer . By contrast, Broome argues, a prioritarian’s 
commitment to valuing each person’s situation and prospects separately entails that she 
will be indifferent between the two prospects. Fleurbaey, in turn, replies that this way of 
separating egalitarians from prioritarians depends on controversial assumptions about 
evaluating risky social prospects. Partly in response to Fleurbaey’s and Broome’s exchange, 
a literature has developed which looks to risky cases to establish a dividing line between, 
and assess the plausibility of, versions of egalitarianism and prioritarianism.2  
 Daniel Hausman rejects the aforementioned versions of egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism. Instead, he proposes a version of egalitarianism which is grounded in two 
ideas. First, a humanitarian concern to alleviate suffering and deprivation, widen inadequate 
opportunities, and remove causes of helplessness and shame. Second, a concern with the 
social conditions that enable people to become “upright citizens” and that treat such 
citizens as people who have “no betters,” who are possessed of dignity, and who are 
entitled to impartial and respectful treatment. Hausman’s critique of familiar distributive 
theories and his distinctive outline of an ideal society of equals represent noteworthy 
contributions to the “civic egalitarian” literature.3 
 
References 
Adler, M. 2012. Well-Being and Fair Distribution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
                                                     
2
 See, among others, McCarthy (2008), Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009), Fleurbaey (2010), Adler (2012, Chap. 7), 
Bovens (forthcoming), and the contributions to Vol. 24 (2012) of Utilitas.  
3
 See, for example, O’Neill (2008). 
Bovens, L. 2015. “Concerns for the Poorly Off in Evaluating Risky Prospects,” Economics and 
Philosophy. 
Fleurbaey, M. 2010. “Assessing Risky Social Situations,” Journal of Political Economy 118: 
649-680. 
McCarthy, D. 2008. “Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism II,” Economics and Philosophy 24: 1–
33. 
O’Neill, M. 2008. “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 36: 119-
156. 
Otsuka, M. and A. Voorhoeve, “Why It Matters that Some Are Worse Off than Others: An 
Argument against the Priority View,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37: 171-199. 
Temkin, L. 2000. “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection”, in The Ideal of 
Equality, eds. Clayton, Matthew and Williams, Andrew, New York: Macmillan, pp. 
126-161. 
Temkin, L. 2003. “Equality, Priority, or What?” Economics and Philosophy 19: 61-88. 
